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What	happened	to	Europe’s	left?
Only	a	handful	of	European	states	are	currently	governed	by	left-wing	governments,	and	several	of	the
traditionally	largest	left-wing	parties,	such	as	the	Socialist	Party	in	France,	have	experienced	substantial
drops	in	support.	Jan	Rovny	argues	that	while	many	commentators	have	linked	the	left’s	decline	to	the
late-2000s	financial	crisis,	the	weakening	of	Europe’s	left	reflects	deep	structural	and	technological
changes	that	have	reshaped	European	society,	leaving	left-wing	parties	out	in	the	cold.
Last	year	was	an	‘annus	horribilis’	for	the	European	left.	In	Austria,	France,	and	the	Czech	Republic,	the	left	lost	its
governing	position,	and	the	same	might	occur	in	Italy	in	a	few	weeks.	Today,	only	Portugal,	Greece,	Sweden,
Slovakia,	and	Malta	are	governed	by	the	left.	The	2017	collapse	was	precipitous.	The	Dutch	Workers’	party	went
from	roughly	25%	to	6%;	the	French	Socialist	Party	went	from	roughly	30%	to	7%.	The	Czech	Social	Democrats
went	from	20%	to	7%.	And	the	Czech	Communist	party	saw	its	worst	result	in	its	almost	100-year	history.
It	may	be	tempting	to	connect	the	failure	of	the	European	left	to	the	recent	economic	recession.	It	was	during	this
recession	or	its	aftermath	that	many	left-wing	governments	(in	Britain,	Spain,	Denmark)	lost	their	mandates.
Undeniably,	the	recession	with	its	massive	social	cost	caused	much	electoral	instability,	and	opened	a	political	door
to	various	populist	challengers.	It	would	be,	however,	naive	to	suggest	that	the	economic	crisis	was	anything	other
than	a	catalyst.	It	was	an	accelerator	that	speeded	up	the	onset	of	consequences	of	a	structural	development	that	we
have	been	witnessing	for	at	least	three	decades.
The	weakening	of	the	political	left	has	been	long	in	the	making.	It	has	been	largely	caused	by	deep	structural	and
technological	change	that	has	altered	the	face	of	European	societies,	changed	the	economic	patterns	of	the
continent,	and	given	a	renewed	vigour	to	politics	of	identity.	In	this	process,	traditional	left-wing	parties	have	lost	not
only	the	grasp	of	their	main	political	narrative,	they	have	lost	much	of	their	traditional	electorates.	These	electorates
did	not	so	much	‘switch’	away	from	the	left,	they	have	rather	disappeared	as	a	comprehensible	social	group.
What	was	left	behind?
Let	us	start	at	the	beginning	by	asking	what	was	the	European	left	in	its	heyday.	The	defining	characteristic	of	the
post-war	European	left	(which	was	distinct	from	the	eastern	European	left	of	the	time)	was	the	democratic	fight	for
the	rights	of	working	people.	Shortly	after	the	Second	World	War,	most	of	the	mainstream	European	left	rejected
Communism,	and	accepted	a	democratic	path	towards	the	emancipation	and	support	of	the	working	class.	During
the	golden	age	of	post-war	development,	the	left	participated	in	the	construction	of	European	welfare	regimes,	and
where	it	has	been	most	successful	–	in	Scandinavia	–	it	built	up	universalistic,	egalitarian,	and	predominantly	tax-
funded	and	state-run	systems	of	welfare	provision.
In	this	construction,	the	parties	of	the	left	have	primarily	leaned	on	a	significant	and	relatively	homogenous	group	of
working	class	electorates.	These	electorates	were	since	the	late	19th	century	defined	by	a	strong	sense	of	group
belonging,	or	‘class	consciousness’.	This	consciousness	was	constructed	from	the	cradle	and	lasted	to	the	grave.	It
was	passed	on	from	parents	to	children,	and	cultivated	by	a	plethora	of	party-associated	organisations,	such	as
daycare	centres,	sports	clubs,	choral	societies,	women’s	clubs,	and	others.	Together	with	workers’	unions	organising
the	work	on	factory	floors,	and	later	in	offices,	these	organisations	helped	construct	a	working-class	subculture	that
permeated	the	social	as	well	as	the	political,	and	that	ensured	the	electoral	stability	of	the	European	left.
Seymour	Martin	Lipset	suggested	that	the	greatest	achievement	of	the	left	had	been	the	lifting	of	the	working	class
away	from	authoritarianism	and	towards	cosmopolitanism	espoused	by	left-wing	intellectuals.	Indeed,	the	general
success	of	the	left	in	capturing	and	‘educating’	the	lower	social	strata	profoundly	shaped	European	party	systems.	In
western	Europe,	the	political	left	has	been	uniformly	and	continuously	associated	with	progressive	policies	not	only	in
the	economic	domain,	but	also	in	non-economic	matters	such	as	the	environment,	women’s	rights,	and	(slowly	and
shyly)	the	rights	of	minorities	–	both	ethnic	and	sexual.
Somewhat	paradoxically,	the	left’s	success	precipitated	its	own	demise	in	a	dialectic	fashion.	First,	the	emancipation
of	the	working	class	–	primarily	the	extension	of	access	to	higher	education	–	changed	the	working	class	and	its
dependence	on	left-wing	subcultures	and	organisations.	Second,	the	left’s	enabling	of	the	search	for	rights	allowed
younger	generations	to	seek	personal	liberation	from	traditional	hierarchies,	including	those	of	the	left.
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From	proletariat	to	‘precariat’
Having	lived	in	Gothenburg,	Sweden,	the	home	of	the	Volvo,	I	eagerly	visited	the	Volvo	factory,	looking	forward	to
meeting	the	contemporary	proletariat.	What	did	I	see?	Halls	and	halls	of	conveyor	belts	shuffling	skeletons	that	would
become	fancy	SUVs	in	about	an	hour,	while	silver	robotic	arms	added	various	parts	to	them.	And	the	working	class?
I	saw	precious	few	of	them.	They	were	mostly	young	women,	sitting	on	comfortable	chairs	surrounded	by	computer
screens	and	keyboards,	listening	to	their	iPods…	I	later	learned	that	these	workers	earn	as	much	as	Swedish
university	professors	(that	means	–	a	lot).
The	traditional	working	class	as	we	imagine	it	from	the	times	of	Henry	Ford	does	not	exist	anymore.	Most	of	the
workers	at	Volvo	with	their	above-average	pay,	comfort	and	job	security	can	hardly	be	considered	as	such.	Today’s
working	class	is	much	less	visible,	and	much	more	atomised.	Today’s	working	class	are	the	masses	of	unskilled
service	workers	who	predominantly	cook,	clean	or	drive.	Often,	their	jobs	are	short-term	or	part-time,	and	low-paying.
These	people	do	not	come	into	contact	with	each	other	nearly	as	much	as	the	traditional	factory-floor	workers	did.
They	are	more	often	than	not	from	diverse	minority	backgrounds,	and	thus	are	separated	by	cultural	boundaries.	In
short,	these	people	have	significantly	reduced	ability	to	organise,	and	they	do	not.	As	my	research	with	Allison	Rovny
shows,	their	political	belonging	is	weak,	and	–	in	the	absence	of	a	formative	subculture	–	it	is	malleable.
The	extension	of	access	to	higher	education	has	increased	the	individual	ability	of	people	to	process	more	complex
information	and	make	their	own	choices.	As	education	also	brings	better	jobs,	this	process	has	created	more
cognitively	and	financially	independent	citizens.	The	1968	generation	opted	for	more	socially	liberal	and	less
hierarchical	politics,	forming	new	social	movements	and	later	political	parties	that	espoused	left-wing	economics,	but
that	were	defined	by	their	social	and	cultural	openness.
In	the	context	of	the	changing	working	class	and	the	developing	political	supply,	the	traditional	left	parties	became
parties	of	the	new	middle	class	–	primarily	of	the	increasing	numbers	of	white-collar	state	employees.	In	doing	so,	the
traditional	left	responded	to	the	Green	challenge	by	adopting	more	environmental	and	generally	socially	liberal
profiles,	but	also	it	slowly	but	surely	abandoned	the	new	‘precariat’	–	the	new	service	working	classes	and	those	in
poor	or	irregular	employment.	Politically	pulled	by	social-liberalism	(of	the	‘new’	left),	and	by	economic	moderation	to
the	centre	(preferred	by	a	new	group	of	urban	white-collar	workers	and	‘yuppies’),	the	traditional	left	opened	a
political	breach	–	a	gaping	political	vacuum	around	those	seeking	economic	protection,	and	a	certain	cultural
traditionalism.	The	salience	of	this	left	and	traditionalist	political	space,	vacated	by	the	mainstream	left	parties,	would
be	boosted	by	another	important	structural	development	–	the	growth	of	transnational	exchange.
Transnational	transformations
The	fall	of	the	Berlin	Wall	in	1989	was	a	symbolic	milestone,	opening	not	just	communist	eastern	Europe,	but	the
entire	developed	world	up	to	increased	international	exchange.	My	ongoing	research	with	Gary	Marks,	Liesbet
Hooghe	and	David	Attewell	shows	that	the	three	decades	since	have	witnessed	significant	liberalisation	of
international	trade,	expressed	in	the	formation	of	the	WTO,	and	in	the	deepening	of	European	integration,	which	has
always	practically	centred	around	the	free	flow	of	goods,	capital	and	people.	The	opening	of	European	borders,	as
well	as	various	conflicts	on	Europe’s	doorstep	and	beyond,	further	increased	migration	into	and	within	Europe.
The	rise	of	transnationalism	–	of	extensive	cross-border	flows	of	goods,	services,	money	and	people	–	is	firstly	an
economic	phenomenon.	It	replaces	domestic	products	and	labourers	with	cheaper	foreign	alternatives.
Transnationalism	thus	divides	society	into	those	who,	while	happily	consuming	cheaper	products,	earn	their	income
in	either	sheltered	(public)	or	internationally	competitive	sectors	on	the	one	hand,	and	those,	on	the	other	hand,
whose	livelihood	is	threatened	by	foreign	competition	in	the	form	of	imported	products,	and	imported	labourers.
Transnationalism	thus	creates	economic	winners	and	losers,	who	are	increasingly	keenly	aware	of	their	status	in	our
globalised	societies.
Transnationalism	is,	however,	also	a	cultural	phenomenon.	While	the	privileged	enjoy	cross-border	travel	for
business	and	pleasure	on	an	unparalleled	scale,	they	gain	experiences,	learn	languages,	build	friendships	and,	on
occasion,	have	found	families	across	borders	and	cultures;	those	with	limited	financial,	and	educational	means	live	in
a	world	defined	by	national	boundaries,	customs,	and	language.	The	inflow	of	culturally	distinct	migrants	into	urban
centres	furthers	this	alienation.	This	opens	a	cultural	chasm	between	the	transnational	cosmopolitans,	concentrating
in	larger	cities	that	increasingly	embrace	pluri-culturalism,	and	national	traditionalists	mostly	present	in	smaller,
peripheral	localities,	fearful	of	immigrants,	and	sceptical	of	their	immigrant-accepting	cosmopolitan	co-nationals.
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Transnationalism	redefines	the	political	space	by	dissociating	economic	progressivism	from	socio-cultural	openness.
Transnationalism	associates	cosmopolitanism	with	open	economic	exchange	on	the	one	side,	and	national
traditionalism	with	economic	protectionism	on	the	other.	In	doing	so,	transnationalism	effectively	shatters	the	old
electoral	coalition	of	the	left.	The	naturally	protectionist	workers	are	pulled	away	from	the	naturally	cosmopolitan
intellectuals.	This	brings	us	back	to	the	great	political	void,	to	the	question	of	who	will	represent	the	new	‘precariat’,
seeking	economic	protection,	and	cultural	traditionalism.	Transnationalism	also	increases	the	salience	of	populist
anti-elitism,	as	rural	traditionalists	feel	unrepresented	by,	shunned	by,	and	distinct	from	the	largely	urban,
cosmopolitan	elite.	The	populist	call	to	the	‘common	man’,	is	a	call	of	economic	and	cultural	protection	against	the
transformations	of	transnationalism.
The	left	out
In	shifting	its	focus	to	the	new	middle	classes,	the	left	let	the	new	‘precariat’	fall	towards	nationalist	protectionism,
where	it	became	fertile	ground	for	the	populist	radical	right.	The	populist	radical	right	has	been	around	for	a	good
while.	First,	as	an	anti-tax,	anti-welfare	critique	of	the	left,	but	later,	with	the	dawn	of	transnationalism,	it	tapped	into
the	sensitive	issue	of	immigration	with	game-changing	vigour.	Attracting	a	wide	coalition	of	economic	interests
through	its	blurry	economic	proposals,	as	my	earlier	research	shows,	the	radical	right	married	its	traditional	petit
bourgeois	electorate	to	swaths	of	the	new	‘precariat’,	and	outperformed	the	left	as	the	dominant	political	voice	of	the
contemporary	working	classes.
The	transformation	of	the	left,	however,	offers	opportunities	for	diverse	political	entrepreneurs.	As	my	forthcoming
work	with	Jonathan	Polk,	as	well	as	with	Bruno	Palier	and	Allison	Rovny	demonstrates,	in	countries	that	experienced
particularly	drastic	economic	downturn	during	the	economic	recession,	such	as	Greece	and	Spain,	and	where	the
‘precariat’	consequently	includes	many	young	and	educated	citizens,	the	populist	challengers	are	mostly	radical	left
parties	that	call	for	a	return	to	true	–	economically	interventionist,	and	culturally	liberal	–	left-wing	politics.	In	other
places,	populists	eschewing	comprehensible	political	labels	gain	electoral	support	largely	through	the	votes	of	the
‘precarious’	left-behind.
The	transformation	of	the	proletariat	into	the	‘precariat’,	together	with	the	dawn	of	transnationalism,	have	reframed
the	political	field.	Post-war	politics	saw	economic	interests	–	primarily	the	extent	and	contours	of	the	welfare	state	–
as	the	dominant	political	contest	that	subsumed	or	largely	ignored	other,	non-economic	divides.	The	new	politics	of
transnationalism	promises	to	be	a	politics	of	identity,	with	the	cleaving	lines	defined	by	ethno-national	labels,	as	well
as	by	the	distinction	between	large	urban	centres	and	the	rural	periphery.	As	my	work	with	Gary	Marks,	Liesbet
Hooghe	and	David	Attewell	suggests,	these	divides	may	be	as	deep,	sticky	and	formative,	as	were	the	traditional
class	lines	of	the	20th	century.	While	these	divides	are	as	economically	rooted,	as	they	are	cultural,	the	new	political
entrepreneurs	will	find	it	easier	to	frame	their	narratives	in	identity-based	terms.	We	should	thus	expect	to	see
economic	issues	couched	in	non-economic	discourses	of	national	and	local	identity.
This	competition	frame	is	foreign	to	traditional	left-wing	parties,	whose	identity	was	always	rooted	in	economic	class.
They	are	facing	a	struggle	to	adapt	to	this	changing	dimensional	structure.	Recent	presidential	elections	in	France	as
well	as	in	the	Czech	Republic	demonstrate	the	shift,	as	both	countries	saw	a	leftish	authoritarian	opposed	by	a
centrist	liberal	in	the	second	round,	while	the	traditional	left	imploded.	Interestingly,	in	the	context	of	this	new	political
competition,	the	west	resembles	the	east,	and	the	mainstream	left	everywhere	is	left	out	in	the	cold.
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
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